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I. Introduction
Beware ladies! Alleged Cheater: Todd Hollis.
"This guy is a trip. In fact ...he's a DOG ...he is believed to
have HERPES. Stay away!... DO NOT DATE HIM. He gave me an
STD and dated 2 people at a time. "'
After these allegations about Hollis were posted by anonymous
individuals on the popular website dontdatehimgirl.com,2 he notified
the website operator that the statements were not true.3 When the
website operator, Tasha Cunningham,' did not remove the comments,
Hollis sued her in 2006 in Pennsylvania county court for defamation
Although the Pennsylvania court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of
personal jurisdiction,6 Hollis filed a nearly identical complaint in the
district court for the Southern District of Florida.7
Cunningham claims she is protected from liability under the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), a federal statute enacted in
1996.8 She asserts that section 230 of the CDA immunizes her from
defamation liability as either a publisher or a distributor.9 If courts

1. Complaint at exhibit A, Hollis v. Cunningham, No. 07-23112 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov.
29, 2007).
2. Tasha Cunningham, known as Tasha Joseph at the time of the interview, the
founder of "Don't Date Him Girl," told the Miami Herald that the website has about
600,000 registered users and receives about one million hits each day. Monica Hatcher,
Don't Date Him Site Draws Defamation Suit: A Website Allowing Women to Slam the Men
Who Have Wronged Them Is Being Sued by a Man Claiming Character Defamation,
MIAMI HERALD, July 1, 2006, at Al.
3. Complaint at 4, Hollis v. Joseph, No. GD 06-12677 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas
filed June 29, 2006).
4. Tasha Cunningham was known as Tasha Joseph at the time the complaint was
initially filed.
5. See generally id.
6. See Joe Mandak, Judge Tosses Date-DissingWebsite Suit, USA TODAY, April 11,
2007,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-04-11-dating-sitelawsuitN.htm (last viewed Feb. 17, 2008).
7. Complaint, Hollis v. Cunningham, No. 07-23112 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 29, 2007).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2008).
9. Preliminary Objections to Complaint at 5-6, Hollis, No. GD 06-12677.
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agree with her argument, Hollis' only relief would be to seek damages
from the individual posters, who may be difficult to identify and
would be unlikely to have the financial resources to make the lawsuit
worthwhile.
The Don't Date Him Girl case may present particularly
entertaining facts, but its legal issues are illustrative of serious
conflicts within Internet defamation jurisprudence.
Publishers accused of defamation may be held to various
standards of liability. If the plaintiff is a public figure, the publisher is
protected under the actual malice standard. This standard was first
implemented by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan,0
and it requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant published the
statement knowing that it was false, or with reckless disregard for its
truth." If cases involve private plaintiffs, states may apply the
standard of review they deem appropriate, which most often is
negligence.
Those who republish a libelous statement do not escape liability
simply because they did not originally create the content. Within the
context of libel republication, the common law has distinguished
between primary publishers and secondary publishers, which are
usually called distributors. The distinction is based on the degree of
control possessed by the defamation defendant. Primary publishers
are presumed to have a greater degree of control over the material
they publish, and therefore are held to stringent standards of liability
when they republish defamatory content. Newspapers have editorial
control over their content and therefore are considered primary
publishers. Thus, they are liable for content contained in
advertisements and letters to the editor, even though the original
content was created by another entity.
Secondary publishers, on the other hand, include those entities
that have little or no control over what they republish. These
publishers, usually called distributors, are presumed to be passive
conduits of information and therefore are only held liable for
defamatory content they transmit if they knew or had reason to know
that the material was defamatory.1 2 This standard provides shelter for
entities that cannot screen the content they distribute, providing a

10.
11.
12.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977) [hereinafter Restatement].
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necessary haven for telegraph companies,'3 bookstores,'4 and other
similarly situated parties. Internet service providers that enable the
publication of its users' statements have been uniformly classified as
distributors."
In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act,
which provides in section 230 that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.' 6 In its plain meaning, this provision shields interactive
website operators from publisher liability. Yet when the U.S. Court of
Appeals Fourth Circuit interpreted section 230 to provide web
operators with immunity from distributor liability as well in Zeran v.
America Online, Inc.,"' many courts followed. 8 Ten years after the

enactment of the CDA, many jurisdictions provide Internet operators
with complete immunity from both publisher and distributor liability.
This immunity has also been extended to Internet users who
republish defamatory material.
The results of the Zeran interpretation have been problematic.
By abolishing distributor liability, usually the only defendant that can
be held accountable is the original content creator. This outcome is
particularly frustrating when the interactive Internet service operator
had an active role in posting the content or was otherwise acutely
aware of the defamatory statement's existence on its web space. 9
Victims of egregious defamation have virtually no recourse, as the
original web publisher is often an anonymous individual that even if
identified," has few resources to compensate the plaintiff. Moreover,
if website operators do not have any liability for the comments
published on the site, the utility of the internet may be diminished
over time if it abounds with false information.

13. See, e.g., Mason v. Western Union Tel. Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 429 (Cal. App. Ct.
1975).
14. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
15. See, e.g., Cubby v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).
17. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
18. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1998);
Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).
19. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034 (finding listserv operator immune under section 230).
20. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace,

49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000) (examining process by which anonymous Internet users may be
identified in defamation lawsuits).
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Several courts have found fault with Zeran's interpretation of
section 230, with one California Court of Appeal specifically
interpreting section 230 to provide no immunity whatsoever for
distributor liability. In the 2003 decision of Barrett v. Rosenthal,21 the
California court looked to the legislative history of section 230 and
determined that it was never intended to provide such sweeping
immunity to web operators. 22 The court's solution was notice-based
liability, where a web operator would be liable for a defamatory
comment posted by a user if the operator refused to remove the23
comment after receiving notice of the defamation from the victim.
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal in
November 2006, finding that section 230 protects Internet publishers
from distributor liability. 4
Although the California Court of Appeal's interpretation of
section 230 was short-lived, it is nonetheless quite troubling as a
potential interpretation for other courts to adopt in the future. If
interactive web operators are subject to notice-based liability, they
may tend to remove any content that is the subject of a complaint,
thereby pulling some content that is not actually false or defamatory.
This notice-based liability places great power in the hands of any
person who becomes the topic of an uncomplimentary Internet
posting, as a notice to the web operator claiming defamation could
easily result in the removal of the posting.
These legal issues have implications that reach numerous web
entities. Many Internet mega-companies such as Amazon and eBay
rely largely on third-party content to provide feedback and user
reviews. 2' These companies have expressed concern that the
imposition of notice-based liability could prevent them from offering
these user-integrated forums.26
Blogs, 27 which are rapidly gaining popularity as a source of
information, 28 also rely largely on reader comments to improve and

21. 112 Cal. App. 4th 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
22. Id. at 781.
23. Id.
24. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006).
25. Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com, Inc. et al. at 37-38, Barrett v. Rosenthal, No.
S122953 (Cal. Dec. 6, 2004).
26. Id.
27. Weblogs vary in layout and style, but the most fundamental definition of a blog is
a website that contains journal entries which are date-stamped and in reverse
chronological order. Darlene Fichter, Blogging Your Life Away, ONLINE, May/June 2001,
at 68.

84
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expand the content provided on the site. Bloggers, with their limited
knowledge of the law and their limited financial resources, are
particularly vulnerable to notice-based liability as they are perhaps
the most likely to be intimidated into removing questionable content.
Many websites are similar to the Don't Date Him Girl site
mentioned earlier in the sense that they rely solely on user content to
exist. Without clear legal standards to guide the operator in handling
defamation complaints, these websites may find themselves in
unpredictable and expensive lawsuits, which could be devastating to
low-profit or non-profit Internet forums, including massively popular
merging sites such as YouTube and Craigslist.
Thus, the interpretation of section 230 of the CDA has longreaching effects on website operators, defamation victims, and
Internet users as a whole. An effective solution must consider the
serious policy implications at stake while remaining consistent with
First Amendment jurisprudence. No commentator appears to have
crafted a workable solution that relies on First Amendment
jurisprudence yet also considers the difficult policy issues discussed so
far.
This article examines the First Amendment and statutory
foundations of libel law for publishers, re-publishers, and distributors,
with an emphasis on libel law applications on the Internet. By
incorporating these historical constitutional and policy objectives, the
article proposes a new approach to handling defamation complaints
against interactive website operators. Part II provides an examination
of libel law as it has been applied to the traditional mediums of print
and broadcasting, with an emphasis on the major Supreme Court libel
cases of the 1960s and 1970s. Part II examines the common law
foundations of libel republication liability, followed by an overview of
the application of these common law principles to early Internet
republication cases. Part III then discusses the enactment and text of
section 230 of the CDA, followed by an examination of the numerous
appellate opinions that discuss the legislation's appropriate scope and
application. Part IV discusses the policy issues implicated by section
230 and its interpretations and then draws on these policy issues, as
well as the legal principles discussed in Parts I and II to formulate a

28. The National Institute for Technology and Liberal Education conducts a "census"
of blogs every two weeks using a web crawler. In February 2008, the census reported 2.8
million blogging sites. NITLE Home Page, http://www.blogcensus.net (last visited
February 17, 2008).
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solution that considers Supreme Court precedent, Congressional
intent, and the various policy issues involved.
II. History of Libel Liability
A.

Early Interpretations of Libel Law

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.29
Although these words have been interpreted to provide
constitutional protection to the media and individual citizens who

speak or write false statements, this interpretation was not advanced
by the Supreme Court until the mid-twentieth century. Although case
law is sparse, research has indicated that throughout the eighteenth

and early nineteenth centuries,

courts found that the First

Amendment served primarily as a ban against prior restraint, 3 and
individuals whose speech was found to be contrary to public welfare
could be the subject of criminal prosecution." During this period, the
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. First Amendment researcher Leonard Levy examined colonial-era letters, court
documents, and other government records to determine that the prevailing interpretation
of the First Amendment was that it banned prior restraints, but permitted punishment for
critical speech. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (Harper Torchbooks 1963) (1960). Levy
softened his position somewhat after examining newspapers of the period. LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (Oxford University Press 1985) (1985). In both
texts, Levy asserts that American courts followed the common law interpretations of
England, most notably the British legal authority William Blackstone. Blackstone's
interpretation of the common law of libel clearly asserted that a free press was
accomplished by eliminating prior restraints on the press but allowing subsequent
punishment for injurious statements. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 150-153 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish
Publishing Ltd. 2001) (1769).
31. See United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14, 685)
(noting the indictment for publishing "a false, scandalous and malicious libel upon the
president of the United States"); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). In
Patterson, Justice Holmes noted that:
[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as
may be deemed contrary to the public welfare ....The preliminary freedom
extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may
extend as well to the true as to the false.
205 U.S. at 462 (alteration in original).
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American lawmakers and courts that considered libel laws were
primarily concerned with the protection of an orderly society, and
even true speech that threatened individuals or the government was
subject to criminal libel prosecution.32 Perhaps the most poignant
examples of prosecution for political speech occurred under the
Sedition Act of 1798, which prohibited criticism of the president,
government or Congress. 33 At least twenty-five people were arrested
under the Act, which expired in 1801.34 Truth was not formally
established as a defense to libel by any court until 1804, when a New
York court declared that truth published with "good motives" was a
mitigating factor in libel cases.35
The Court first implied a shift towards a First Amendment
protection against speech prosecution in 1919 in Schenck v. United
States.36 Although the Court upheld the espionage conviction against
the defendant, a Socialist who circulated anti-draft leaflets among
drafted servicemen, the Court's opinion implied the possibility of
protection against subsequent punishment. In the unanimous opinion,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of
speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent
them may have been the main purpose... We admit that in many
places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was
said in the circular would have been within their constitutional
rights.37
Although the Court did imply some constitutional protection
against punishment for speech, libel remained wholly unprotected at
that time. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the
Court grouped libel with other classes of unprotected speech,
including obscenity and "fighting words," noting that "such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be

32. Libel concerning public officials was punished as seditious libel as the speech was
considered a threat to "the security of the state." If the speech targeted an individual, it
was punished as criminal libel because it created a risk "to breaches of the peace." William
Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,40 LAW Q. REv. 302,

305 (1924).
33. 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
34.

Nijhoff
35.
36.
37.

FREE SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 11 (Shimon Shetreet ed., Martinus

Publishers 1991).
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Id. at 51-52.
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derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."38
B.

Constitutional Protection of Libel: New York Times v. Sullivan and Its
Interpretation

The Court did not proclaim a commitment to First Amendment
protection for any type of defamatory speech until 1964 when it
decided the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan.39 During the
turbulent years of the civil rights movement, the New York Times
published an editorial advertisement titled "Heed Their Rising
Voices."' The full-page ad was submitted by the Committee to
Defend Martin Luther King, and it described police abuses of
African-Americans, particularly in Montgomery, Alabama.4 ' The ad
contained several factual errors, and although the Montgomery city
commissioner in charge of the police department was never
mentioned by name, he sued the New York Times and the advertiser
for libel.4 2 The commissioner was awarded $500,000 in damages after
a jury trial, and the award was upheld by Alabama appellate courts. 3
The New York Times appealed to the Supreme Court. The high
court reversed, finding that the "law applied by the Alabama courts is
constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for
freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct."" The Court reasoned that
"erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate 4 5 and that
punishing critics of public officials for any factual errors would chill
speech about matters of political and social importance.4 '6 The Court
established the rule for defamation cases that now governs libel law.
The Court wrote:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
38. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); See also Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-257 (1952) (repeating Chaplinsky statement); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (noting that the First Amendment does not "protect every
utterance," including libel as an unprotected categories of speech).
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40. Id. at 256.
41. Id. at 256-58.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 262-64.
44. Id. at 264.
45. Id. at 271.
46. Id.
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defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is,
with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of
47
whether it was false or not.

Thus, Sullivan created a heavy burden for public-official libel
plaintiffs by requiring them to prove actual malice. The Court
acknowledged that the threat of libel lawsuits can make the press
fearful to publish anything controversial or remotely factually
questionable, limiting the public's knowledge of the conduct of public
officials.48
The Supreme Court continued to expand protection for the press
in libel lawsuits when it decided the consolidated cases of Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts49 and Associated Press v. Walker 0 In the
consolidated cases, the Court extended the Sullivan rule to cases
involving "public figures," those people who are not public officials
but are nonetheless involved in issues of social or political
importance-in these cases, a former University of Georgia athletic
director51 and a former U.S. army general.52 The Court expressly
noted that the protection from libel lawsuits must be extended to
cover public figures because they were the subject of the same type of
public debate at issue in Sullivan. 3 Furthermore, the Court noted that
public figures have "sufficient access to the means of
counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory statements,"54 thereby
adding the plaintiff's access to the media as a consideration in
determining the appropriate standard of liability. Thus, Sullivan and
Curtis Publishing together provide that public officials and public
figures have limited protection against injurious statements made by
the press, as they must prove the defendant published the statement

47. Id. at 279-80.
48. Id.
49. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 135-36.
52. Id. at 140-41.
53. Id. at 147. "From the point of view of deciding whether a constitutional interest of
free speech and press is properly involved in the resolution of a libel question a rational
distinction 'cannot be founded on the assumption that criticism of private citizens who
seek to lead in the determination of... policy will be less important to the public interest
than will criticism of government officials."' (quoting Pauling v. Globe-Democrat
Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966)). Id. at 147-48.
54. Id. at 154 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
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with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for the
truth.55
Until 1971, the Supreme Court had focused on the status of the
libel plaintiff is assessing the appropriate standard of liability. This
focus shifted to the subject matter of the allegedly defamatory speech
when the Court decided Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.5 6 In
Rosenbloom, a plurality of the Court applied the actual malice test
"to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or
general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are
famous or anonymous. 5 7 This standard greatly expanded the scope of
actual malice cases for three years, until the Court abandoned this
test in 1974 when it decided Gertz v. Welch.'8
In Gertz, the Court abandoned the Rosenbloom subject-matter
test and returned to the previous method of examining the status of
the plaintiff. The Court held that private plaintiffs, meaning those
plaintiffs who are neither public officials nor public figures, must
prove a defendant acted with some degree of fault when publishing a
false and injurious statement about the plaintiff.59 The appropriate
standard of fault may de decided by individual states, but the states
must require that private plaintiffs not recover actual damages unless
they prove the defendant was at least negligent in publishing the false
statement. 6 The Court then set forth two categories of public-figure
libel plaintiffs that would be required to prove actual malice. An "allpurpose public figure" is an individual who has "achieve[d] such
pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all
purposes and in all contexts."'" A "limited purpose public figure" is an
individual who would otherwise be considered a private plaintiff, but
who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range
of issues."62
In establishing less protection for public-figure plaintiffs, the
Court reasoned that these individuals' reputations require minimal
protection for two significant reasons. First, public figures voluntarily

55. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Curtis Pub. Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967).
56. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
57. Id. at 44.
58.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).

59. Id. at 330 n.3.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 351.
62. Id.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

expose themselves to public criticism by "assum[ing] roles of special
prominence in the affairs of society., 63 Furthermore, they have access
to the media, which should allow them to publicly counteract a false
and defamatory statement. 6' The Court asserted:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help-using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public
officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access
to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private
individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and
the state interest in protecting them is
correspondingly greater. 65
Courts have incorporated this reasoning as a factor in66
determining an individual's status as a limited-purpose public figure.
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,6 for example, a federally funded scientist
did not have to prove actual malice in his libel lawsuit against Senator
William Proxmire, who had publicly denounced the scientist's
research as wasteful. 68 Despite Hutchinson's involvement in a very
public issue about potentially wasteful government spending, the
Supreme Court considered the scientist's relatively unknown public
status and his limited access to the media in its determination that he
was not a limited-purpose public figure. 69 The court also specifically
noted that Hutchinson's only media appearances were initiated in
defense of his research after Senator Proxmire's accusations were
made public. 0 The Court's comment indicated that a plaintiff should
not be considered to have media access when the individual's only use
of the media was a public defense of the initial defamatory statement.
The Supreme Court further clarified the definition of a limitedpurpose public figure by distinguishing matters of public interest from

63. Id. at 345.
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id. at 344. (citations omitted).
66. See, e.g., Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., 818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting
that an individual may achieve public-figure status by exercising access to media); Lerman
v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that regular and continuing
access to the media is part of public-figure test); National Found. for Cancer Research v.
Council of Better Business Bureaus, 705 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1983) (concluding plaintiff was a
public figure largely due to plaintiff's access to media).
67. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
68. Id. at 135.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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matters of pubic controversy. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,7 the Court
ruled that a wealthy Palm Beach socialite was not a public figure,
despite the intense public interest in her divorce." The Court
reasoned the plaintiff had no choice but to go to court in order to
divorce her husband, therefore failing the Gertz requirement of
voluntary participation in a public issue. 3 Furthermore, the Court
noted that the plaintiff "assumed no 'special prominence' in the
resolution of public questions, 74 indicating that the Court did not
consider a divorce proceeding to be a "public question," regardless of
the fame of those involved.
Similarly, in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,75 the Court
found that the plaintiff did not become a public figure because he
failed to show up for a grand jury proceeding due to his health
problems, even though he knew his absence would generate media
attention.76 These cases indicate that individuals who become the
objects of intense media attention do not necessarily meet the
requirements to become a limited-purpose public figure.
C.

Proving Actual Malice

The Supreme Court cases following Sullivan that clarified and
defined public figures provide evidence of the importance of the legal
distinction between public and private plaintiffs. Identifying a
plaintiff as a public or private figure is often outcome-determinative
in libel cases, as proving actual malice is exceedingly difficult, and
most cases involving public figures are dismissed outright.77
Consequently, the number of public officials who have initiated any
type of libel litigation has dropped dramatically since Sullivan."

71.
72.
73.
74.

424 U.S. 448 (1976).
Id. at 454-55.
Id.
Id.

75.

443 U.S. 157 (1979).

76. Id. at 166-67.
77. The Libel Defense Resource Center, now renamed the Media Law Resource
Center, studied libel cases in the 1980s and 1990s and found that eighty-five percent of
libel claims brought by public figures were dismissed, while sixty-eight percent of claims
brought by private plaintiffs were dismissed. LDRC, 1997 Report on Summary Judgment
(New York 1997).
78. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, Media Law, Media Content, and American
Exceptionalism, in POLITICAL DEBATE AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA: THE FRAGILITY

OF FREE SPEECH 63 (Susanne Nikoltchev ed., 2004). The author notes that "for all
practical purposes the libel suit brought by a public official or public figure against the
media or against a political opponent has disappeared from American public life." Id.
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The Supreme Court has consistently approached cases involving
the interpretation of actual malice applications with a continued
protection of the principles promulgated in Sullivan, beginning with
consistent rulings placing the burden of proof on plaintiffs. Sullivan
clearly held that the burden of proving actual malice falls onto the

plaintiffs, 79 and the Court later ruled that both public-figure8" and
private plaintiffs8 bear the burden of proving falsity.
The Court also interpreted the scope of "reckless disregard for

the truth" in a manner favorable to defendants. In the same year it set
forth the actual malice test, the Court ruled in 1964 that reckless
disregard requires a showing that the defendant published a false

statement "with [a] high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity., 82 Four years later, the Court ruled in St. Amant v. Thomson83

that a libel plaintiff must prove the defendant "entertained serious
doubt as to the truth of his publication" in order to prove reckless
disregard,' indicating that actual malice requires more than a showing
of lack of care. In addition to setting a high burden for actual malice
plaintiffs, these holdings indicate that actual malice focuses on the

mental state of the defendant prior to publication.
In order to determine weather the defendant was aware of the
probable falsity of a particular publication, courts may inquire into
the editorial process that occurred prior to the publication. In Herbert
v. Lando,85 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that press
defendants should be afforded a testimonial privilege protecting

inquiry into journalists' "thought processes" and prepublication
discussions.'

The

Court

ruled

that

such

a

privilege

would

substantially increase the burden of proving actual malice to an extent

79. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
80. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (determining that Sullivan
stands for the proposition that "a public official [is] allowed the civil [defamation] remedy
only if he establishes that the utterance was false"). See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 176 (1979) ("[T]he plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a false
publication attended by some degree of culpability").
81. See Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that private
plaintiffs involved in matter of public concern must prove falsity in case with media
defendant).
82. Garrison,379 U.S. at 74.
83. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
84. Id. at 731. The Court clarified that its ruling would not protect a journalist who
had "obvious reasons" to doubt the truth of a story, nor would it protect a journalist who
relied solely on his own testimony that he believed the story to be true. Id. at 732.
85. 441 U.S. 153 (U.S. 1979)
86. Id. at 161.
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inconsistent with the Court's prior holdings in Sullivan and Curtis
87
Publishing.

may

The Supreme Court has provided some specific examples of what
or may not constitute actual malice. In Harte-Hanks

Communications v. Connaughton, 8 the Court ruled that although
failure to adhere to professional standards does necessarily not
amount to actual malice, intentional avoidance of facts may lead to a
finding of reckless disregard for the truth.89 In the case of HarteHanks, journalists should have been suspicious of contradictory facts,

but nevertheless failed to interview key sources and refused to listen
to a revealing tape recording, indicating an intentional avoidance of

the truth. 9°
D.

Proving Negligence

Private-figure plaintiffs usually must prove negligence in libel
actions. 9' Courts typically apply well-established principles of
negligence when adjudicating libel cases involving private-figure
plaintiffs. 92 Plaintiffs generally must prove negligence by proving
through a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant failed to
act in a reasonably prudent manner. 93
When examining the behavior of a libel defendant, the tests for
negligence vary by state, particularly when the defendant is a member
of the news media. Some states require the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's conduct failed to meet professional standards,94
87. Id at 169. In the Court's view, the privilege would "modify firmly established
constitutional doctrine by placing beyond the plaintiffs reach a range of direct evidence
relevant to proving knowing or reckless falsehood." Id.
88. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
89. Id. at 692.
90. Id.
91. As of 1999, Professor Smolla had identified 31 states that apply some form of the
negligence standard in private defamation actions. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION §§ 3.89, 3.93, 3.96, 3.106, 3.111 (Thomas West 1999).
92. ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 343 (3d ed. 1999)

93. A breach of duty to exercise reasonable care toward another that results in harm
to that person constitutes negligence. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30
(W. Page Keeton et al. eds., West Publishing Co. 1984) (1941). Reasonable care in the
context of a skilled profession is measured according to the skill normally exercised within
the profession. Id. at § 32.
94. States that examine industry standards in libel cases include: Arizona, see Peagler
v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d 1216 (Ariz. 1977); Delaware, see Re v. Gannet Co.,
480 A.2d 662 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984); Georgia, see Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chumley, 317
S.E.2d 534 (Ga. 1984); Iowa, see Jones v. Palmer Commc'n, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa
1989); Maryland, see Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976); Massachusetts,
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' Other
essentially requiring a showing of "journalistic malpractice."95
states require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant did not act in a
reasonable manner, apart from media standards. 96 The use of

standard media procedures as a benchmark provides private plaintiffs

with a lesser burden of proof than public-figure plaintiffs, as a
plaintiff proving actual malice must prove conduct more reckless than
a departure from typical media procedures.97

The constitutional tenets of libel law provide a partial foundation
for examining the basis of liability for defamation on the Internet. An
examination of libel republication law will provide the additional

background necessary for analysis of the complex issues involved with
interactive website defamation.
IlI. Republication of Libel
A.

Common Law Standard

Republication of a statement occurs when it is made initially by
one party, and then repeated by another. The common law
continuously has held the re-publisher of a libelous statement to the

same liability as the original defamer.98 American courts have found
this extended liability to be equitable and necessary as "tale bearers

see Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721 (Mass. 1985); Minnesota, see
Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1985); Kansas, see
Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co., 531 P.2d 76 (Kan. 1975); Oklahoma, see Martin v. Griffin
Television Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Texas, see Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43
S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2001); and Utah, see Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah
1981).
95. See Hugh J O'Halloran, Comment, Journalistic Malpractice: The Need for a
ProfessionalStandardof Carein Defamation Cases, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 63 (1988).
96. States that employ a reasonable person standard when examining a libel
defendant's negligence are: Tennessee, see Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412
(Tenn. 1978); Washington, see Taskett v. King Broad. Co., 546 P.2d 81 (Wash. 1976);
Illinois, see Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292 (I11.1975); Kentucky, see McCall v. CourierJournal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982); Ohio, see Landsowne v. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co., 512 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio 1987);
Oregon, see Bank of Or. v. Indep. News, Inc., 693 P.2d 35 (Or. 1985); Virginia, see
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 362 S.E.2d 32 (Va. 1987); and Arkansas; see
KARK-TV v. Simon, 656 S.W.2d 702 (Ark. 1983).
97. The Supreme Court explicitly held that failure to adhere to professional
standards does not amount to actual malice Harte-Hanks.491 U.S. at 664-65.
98.

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION

1999) (1980).

§7.1 (Practicing Law Institute 3d ed.
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are as bad as tale makers." 99 As a result of this common law rule of
republication liability, publishers may be liable when they print or
repeat false allegations made by other parties.'" The re-publisher may

find protection, however, in several republication privileges.
B.

Exceptions to Common Law Liability
In most jurisdictions, the news media is protected when it

accurately reports on an official proceeding or report, even if the
government meeting or document contains defamatory statements. °0
This privilege, called "fair report," varies by jurisdiction, with some
courts applying an absolute privilege, 2 and other courts applying a
conditional privilege that is lost if the defendant republished the
statement with ill will.' °3
A slightly expanded protection exists in some jurisdictions for
the news media that report a neutral and accurate account of a
newsworthy charge made by a responsible and prominent
organization against a public figure." 4 This privilege, called the

neutral reportage privilege, is important because without it, public
figures could falsely make astonishing or ludicrous accusations about

another public figure, yet the accusation could not be reported
because the media knew it was probably false, thus meeting the actual

malice burden. This privilege is applied differently from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, 5 and many states and circuits do not apply the neutral
reportage privilege at all.""
99. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1984). See generally
McDonald v. Glitsch, 589 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (quoting Houston
Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Wegner, 182 S.W. 45, 48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915)).
100. This liability was dramatically illustrated in the recent case of Vanity Fair
correspondent Dominick Dunne, who told television audiences that he had inside sources
that implicated Congressman Gary Condit in the disappearance and murder of Chandra
Levy, the congressman's former intern. Condit v. Dunne, 317 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). The court held that Dunne could not avoid liability merely because he told his
audiences that the story came from other sources as "republication of false facts threatens
the target's reputation as much as does the original publication." Id. at 363.
101. Restatement § 611. The original defamatory statement usually is privileged as well,
as government officials acting in their official capacity may not be held liable for
defamation. See BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 10.4 (Law & Business, Inc.
2004) (1985) (explaining application of the absolute privilege to the judiciary, the
executive branch, legislators, and local officials).
102. See SACK, supra note 98, at § 7.3.2 n. 57 for cases applying an absolute privilege.
103. See SACK, supranote 98, at § 7.3.2 n. 59 for cases applying a conditional privilege.
104. Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Society, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1002 (1977).
105. Some courts do not require the original defamer to be responsible or prominent,
some courts do not require that the defamed be a public figure, and some courts are more
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The wire service defense is another protection for the media
when it is charged with republication of libel." When a publisher or
broadcaster relies on reports from a reputable news gathering agency,
the agency may be excused from liability if the story appeared to be
true on its face, the news agency believed in its truthfulness, and the
story was republished without substantial changes."8 This defense has

been widely accepted by courts, which have applied it to protect the
efficient dissemination of news.109
C.

Distinction between Primary and Secondary Publishers

An important distinction in a discussion of libel republication is

the difference between primary and secondary publishers. The
distinction is based on the degree of control possessed by the republisher; the higher the degree of control, the higher the duty of care
and corresponding liability. Courts have labeled those entities that

print or broadcast content as primary publishers. Primary publishers
that republish false statements are usually held to the same standard

permissive than others when assessing the defendant's neutrality. See Justin H. Wertman,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 804 (1996) (analyzing jurisdictional differences in application
of neutral reportage privilege).
106. The most recent setback for neutral reportage was the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Troy Publ'g Co. v. Norton. 544 U.S. 956 (2005). Troy was appealed to the
Supreme Court after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the privilege. Norton v.
Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004). See also Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978)
(rejecting adoption of neutral reportage privilege because it would allow media to publish
statements known to be false, contrary to holding in St. Amant v. Thomson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968)); Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(declining to embrace Edwards because the press is "adequately protected" by Sullivan's
malice requirement); McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882
(Ky. 1981) (rejecting newspaper's claim of privilege for allegedly defaming lawyer); Hogan
v. Herald Co., 444 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982) (rejecting adoption of neutral reportage
privilege because Gertz based publisher's immunity on status of plaintiff, not
newsworthiness of publication); Newell v. Field Enters., 415 N.E.2d 434, 452 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (maintaining that no privilege protects reporting defamatory matters).
107. The wire service defense was initially articulated in Layne v. Tribune Co.,
although the term was not coined at that time. 146 So. 234, 237-38 (Fla. 1933).
108. See O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F.Supp. 218 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (holding
newspaper was not required to independently investigate wire stories); Auvil v. CBS "60
Minutes", 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding local broadcasting affiliate was
merely a conduit for national broadcast story and not liable for defamatory content);
Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721 (Mass. 1985) (ruling that
defendant's close proximity to events detailed in defamatory story did not negate wire
service defense).
109. For a history of the application of the wire service defense, see Jennifer L. Del
Medico, Comment, Are Talebearers Really as Bad as Talemakers?: Rethinking Republisher
Liability in an Information Age, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1409 (2004).
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of liability as the original author of the statement." ° Thus, these
potential defendants may be subject to a negligence standard of
liability, or in the case of public figures plaintiffs, they may fall within
the scope of the constitutional libel protection provided by Sullivan'
and Gertz.1"2 These primary publishers are distinguished from
"secondary publishers," which include those entities that merely
circulate or distribute content without editorial control over the
content. A secondary publisher, often called a distributor, is
considered a passive conduit that is only liable for delivering or
transmitting defamatory material if "he knows or has reason to know
of its defamatory character." 3 This low standard places the
distributor in a position where it is only liable if it knows of the
defamatory content it distributes, presumably upon receiving and
ignoring a notice that it is circulating libelous content. The limited
liability placed on distributors is considered necessary and equitable
because distributors have neither the resources nor the expertise to
review all the material they receive. 14 Distributors have been held to
include telegraph companies," 5 television stations that merely
transmit network feed," 6 and bookstores. 7
The classification of a libel defendant as a publisher or
distributor may significantly change the analysis of the liability
involved, especially on the Internet.
D. Republication on the Internet: Early Cases
Republication of libel is a particularly common issue on the
Internet, where information is spread quickly and often by
anonymous or otherwise unaccountable sources. The first major case
to deal with republication of libel on the web occurred in 1991 during
the infancy of the Internet. In Cubby v. CompuServe,"' a New York
district court held that CompuServe was a distributor rather than a
publisher when it hosted an independent Internet forum that

110.
111.

See Restatement § 581(1); KEETON, supra note 93, at § 113.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).

112.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).

113.

Restatement § 581(1).

114. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F Supp 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
115. See, e.g., Mason v. Western Union Tel. Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 429 (Cal. App. Ct.
1975).
116. See, e.g., Medical Lab. Consultants v. American Broad. Cos., 931 F. Supp. 1487
(D. Ariz. 1996).
117. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
118. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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provided users with an interactive bulletin board." 9 The court held
that because CompuServe did not review the content of the postings
published in the online bulletin board, it had no editorial control and
was therefore a distributor.' As a distributor, CompuServe was not
liable for defamatory content in the forum because it did not know or
121
have reason to know of the defamatory content at issue.
This holding was distinguished four years later by a New York
state court which held that an Internet bulletin board host was liable
as a distributor. In Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 122 the
court held that the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that Prodigy
should be considered the publisher of defamatory postings in a
Prodigy-sponsored forum. 23 The court arrived at its conclusion
because Prodigy "held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards,' 24 and,
furthermore, Prodigy utilized software that automatically deleted
comments that were in "bad taste.' 25 The court determined that
Prodigy's editorial control made it a publisher and therefore liable
under traditional theories of publisher libel liability. 2 6 Thus, Stratton
Oakmont arguably created a disincentive for web operators to
monitor offensive or defamatory content, as any such monitoring may
lead to a finding of publisher liability. This concern was directly
addressed in Congress the following year.
E.

Republication on the Internet: The Communications Decency Act and
Zeran

In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which included the CDA. Section 230 of the Act, called the "Good
Samaritan" provision, states in pertinent part: "No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider."'27 "Interactive computer service" is elsewhere defined as
"any information service, system, or access software provider that
119. Id.at 137. The defamatory statement was posted in an online magazine called
"Rumorville." Id. The statements concerned a competing news bulletin service
"Skuttlebut" and Skuttlebut's operators. Id.
120. Id. at 139.
121. Id. at 140-41.
122. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).
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provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated
or services offered by
128
libraries or educational institutions.'
In the statutory finding of section 230, Congress states that the
Internet offers "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues
for intellectual activity. 1 29 Thus, the statute is necessary "to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
'
Federal or State regulation."13
The basis for section 230 is further
highlighted in the legislative history of the section, which explicitly
states that "[t]his section provides 'Good Samaritan' protections from
civil liability for providers or users of an interactive computer service.
•. One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule StrattonOakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions....""'
While this legislation created explicit protection for providers of
"interactive computer services," its scope would be the subject of
litigation for years to follow. The first case to apply section 230 was
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 3 2 In Zeran, plaintiff Kenneth Zeran
was the victim of an Internet hoax where a bulletin board user posted
Zeran's name and phone number in connection with the sale of highly
offensive t-shirts celebrating Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma
City bombings.'33 Zeran notified America Online ("AOL"), which
removed the posting, but new postings continued to appear in the
following days, presumably from the same AOL user.1 4 Zeran
eventually received a threatening telephone call every two minutes as
a result of the postings,'35 and he ultimately needed local police to
protect him in his home. He sued AOL for negligence, arguing that
section 230 only precluded publisher liability but left distributor
liability intact.133 Under Zeran's arguments, AOL would be
128.
129.

§ 230(f)(2).
§ 230(a)(3).

130.

§ 230(b)(2).

131. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
132. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
133. Id. at 329.
134. Id.
135. The high volume of threatening phone calls was due partially to an on-air
announcement by an Oklahoma City radio station that learned of the AOL t-shirt
advertisement and encouraged listeners to call Zeran's number. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 331.
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responsible for the postings as a distributor because the company
knew of the defamatory content expressed in the postings. 3 8 The trial
court granted AOL's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding
that section 230 completely protected AOL from liability. 9
The Fourth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's decision, finding that section 230 precluded both publisher and
distributor liability. 40 The court looked to the definition of distributor
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts14 ' and held that distributor
liability is "merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability." '42 The
court further noted that a contrary interpretation would not serve the
interests expounded by Congress in the policies stated in section
230.143 The court explained its interpretation of section 230:
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.
The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the
communications of others represented, for Congress, simply
another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section
230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference
in the medium to a minimum.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Congress' intent in passing
section 230 to immunize both distributors and publishers.'45
Consequently, the court held that AOL was a "publisher" under
section 230, and therefore was not liable for Zeran's injuries.'46
F.

Following Zeran

Beginning the following year, the effects of Zeran were felt in
147 a
numerous Internet defamation cases. In Blumenthal v. Drudge,
District of Columbia district court applied Zeran to find that AOL
was not responsible for defamatory statements posted on AOL's

138. Id.
139. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1997).
140. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 332. "[B]oth the negligent communication of a defamatory statement and
the failure to remove such a statement when first communicated by another party-each
alleged by Zeran here under a negligence label-constitute publication." Id. (citing
Restatement § 577).
142. Id. at 332.
143. Id. at 333.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 332.
147. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
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website, even though those statements were posted by Matt Drudge,
an independent contractor who AOL paid to write his gossip
newsletter "the Drudge Report" for them. 14 8 The court noted that if it
were ruling on a "clean slate" it would "seem only fair" to find AOL
liable, as AOL profited from Drudge's content and had editorial
control over it. 4 9 Yet the court agreed with the Zeran interpretation
of section 230, finding that it precluded distributor liability, thus
insulating AOL from liability. The Blumenthal court referred to
section 230 as "some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the
service provider community" that "conferred immunity from tort
liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the
Internet ...even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted."'15
The Florida Supreme Court also applied Zeran to preclude
AOL's liability as a distributor.1 51 In Doe v. America Online, Inc., a
four-judge majority found that AOL was not liable for obscene
photographs of children posted to a chat room, even though AOL
knew of the postings.'52 Citing Zeran, the court held that section 230
prohibited any distributor-based liability, including any potential
liability for negligently allowing users to post obscene photographs of
children.153 The court therefore held that under section 230, AOL
could not be liable for the postings.' In a sharp dissent, Justice Lewis,
writing for a three-judge minority, disagreed with the court's decision
to follow Zeran.'55 Lewis criticized the decision, arguing that it
ignored the common-law distinction between publisher and
distributor liability and misinterpreted section 230.156 The dissenting
opinion in Doe marked the first judicial decision that was openly
critical of Zeran'sinterpretation of section 230.
Another development in the interpretation of section 230
occurred in 2003 with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Batzel v. Smith.'57 Plaintiff Ellen Batzel sued a listserv58 operator for

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 1011-12.
Id. at 1014-17.
Id.
dissenting).
Id. at 1018-1028 (Lewis, J.,
Id. at 1019.
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
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posting defamatory comments about her to a subscriber-based e-mail
"' The comments,
list. 59
which claimed she had inherited stolen artwork
because she was a descendent of a high-ranking Nazi officer, were
originally generated by a third party, and had been forwarded on to
the listserv operator for e-mail distribution.'6 The Ninth Circuit held
that the listserv operator was an "interactive computer service"
provider under section 230, and therefore immune from liability,
despite the operator's complete editorial control over the listserv
messages. 161
The broad interpretation of section 230 was advanced again by
the Ninth Circuit in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,162 where the
court held that an online dating service was not liable for a false and
defamatory profile of the plaintiff created by a third party.16 The fact
that the defendant's match-making questionnaire somewhat enabled
the creation of the false profile was not sufficient to make the
defendant an "information content provider" within the meaning of
section 230.6
Most recently, in 2006, the California Supreme Court in Barrett
v. Rosenthal interpreted section 230 more broadly than any court
prior, holding that section 230 provides not only distributor immunity,
but also immunity to individual "users" who are not information
providers. 65 In writing for the unanimous court, Justice Corrigan
noted that the plain language of Section 230 shows that Congress did
not intend for an66 internet user to be treated differently than an
internet provider.1
By applying section 230 to provide distributor immunity, the
Zeran court and those courts which followed its interpretation have
been criticized by academics that disagree with the expansive

158. Id. at 1020-22. The court noted that "[a] listserv is an automatic mailing list
service that amounts to an e-mail discussion ... [s]ubscribers receive and send messages
that are distributed to all others on the listserv." Id. at 1021 n.2.
159. Id. at 1020-22.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1034-35. The court noted that "the exclusion of 'publisher' liability
necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose
among proffered material and to edit the material published while retaining its basic form
and message." Id. at 1031.
162. 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
163. Id. at 1124.
164. Id.
165. 40 Cal. 4th 33, 59 (Cal. 2006).
166. Id. at 58.
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interpretation of the statute.' 67 These critics are not alone, however, as
some courts have found fault with the reasoning in Zeran as well.
G. Curtailing Distributor Liability Immunity Under Section 230
Not all courts have accepted Zeran's sweeping protection of
Internet content distributors. Most notably, a California appellate
court expressly rejected the reasoning in Grace v. eBay,'6a
defamation case brought by an eBay user who was defamed by
another eBay user in the feedback forum of the website.19 The court
held that the established common-law distinction between
distributors and publishers should not be disregarded in interpreting
section 230, especially in light of Congress' express mention of its
desire to overrule Stratton Oakmont, a decision that held an Internet
service operator liable only as a publisher.170 The California court
reasoned that Congress enacted section 230 because the holding in
Stratton Oakmont discouraged "Good Samaritan" Internet computer
service operators from attempting to control damaging content, as
they would then fall into the category of publisher and be liable for
defamatory content under Stratton Oakmont."' The court reasoned
that by immunizing distributors as well, the Zeran court and its
followers were creating a liability-proof Internet where any incentive
to regulate damaging content is eliminated-a result contrary to
Congress' stated intent in passing section 230.172 The court decided
that case on other grounds, however, holding
that eBay's user
13
agreement contained a valid release of liability.
The Seventh Circuit also has indicated that section 230 has been
interpreted too broadly. 174 The court decided that where a client used
the ISP's bandwidth to host videos of college athletes caught
undressing on hidden cameras, an Internet service provider is
classified as a distributor without knowledge of its client's

167. See, e.g., Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional
Defamation Laws Should Apply to Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447 (2006); Jae Hong Lee,
Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third-Party Content
on the Internet, 19 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 469 (2004); Stephanie Blumstein, Note, The New
Immunity in Cyberspace: The Expanded Reach of the Communications Decency Act to the
Libelous "Re-Poster," 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 407 (2003).
168. 120 Cal. App. 984 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
169. Id. at 989-90.
170. Id. at 992-96.
171. Id. at 996.
172. Id. at 996-97.
173. Id. at 999-1000.
174. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).
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wrongdoing. 5 Despite finding that the ISP was not liable for the
videos, Judge Easterbrook mused in the opinion that section 230 had
been misconstrued by other courts. 176 Noting that the statute is titled
"Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive
material," Easterbrook expressed concern that the title was "hardly
an apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing
about the distribution of indecent and offensive material via their
services., 17 7 He then proposed that the statute should be read as
definitional, where a defendant would only be eligible for the
immunity if the entity was a "provider or user." 178 The entity would be
considered a "publisher or speaker" and lose the immunity if it
created the content."9 Media law scholar Rodney Smolla has noted
that Easterbrook's interpretation of section 230 likely will be
advanced by future litigants.' °
Perhaps most notably, a California Court of Appeal specifically
ruled in 2003 that section 230 does not preclude distributor liability.
Although the Court of Appeal's holding was overruled in 2006 by the
California Supreme Court,"' the lower court's analysis is nonetheless
notable as an example of the most limited interpretation thus far of
the scope of section 230. In Barrett v. Rosenthal,82 several physicians
filed an action against Ilena Rosenthal, a women's health activist who
republished highly critical statements about one of the doctors on an
Internet newsgroup after receiving the information in an e-mail from
another person.'8 3 The doctor notified her that the postings were
defamatory, but she refused to remove them and instead posted
additional messages about the doctor and his colleagues'1 Rosenthal
claimed immunity under section 230, arguing that she was a user of an
interactive computer service who had published material from

175. Id. at 659. "A web host, like a delivery service or phone company, is an
intermediary and normally is indifferent to the content of what it transmits. Even entities
that know the information's content do not become liable for the sponsor's deeds." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 660. Easterbrook noted that the title was important because "a statute's
caption must yield to its text when the two conflict." Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180.

RODNEY SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.86 (2d ed. 2004).

181.

Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 63 (Cal. 2006).

182.

112 Cal. App. 4th 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

183.

Id. at 755-56. The statements asserted that the doctor was a "quack" and a

stalker. Id.
184.

Id.
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another information content provider."' The trial court accepted
Rosenthal's argument:
It is undisputed that Rosenthal did not "create" or "develop" the
information in defendant Bolen's piece. Thus, as a user of an
interactive computer service, that is, a newsgroup, Rosenthal is not
be
the publisher or speaker of Bolen's piece. Thus, she cannot
66
civilly liable for posting it on the Internet. She is immune.'
Plaintiff Barrett argued that this interpretation was completely
contradictory to the purpose of section 230, but the
87 court found the
only party at fault was the original content creator.'
The California Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's
holding. The court revisited Zeran and rejected its interpretation of
section 230, agreeing with critics of Zeran that "Zeran's analysis of
section 230 is flawed, in that the court ascribed to Congress an intent
to create a far broader immunity than that body actually had in mind
or is necessary to achieve its purposes."' 88 The court rejected Zeran's
analysis on two grounds. First, the Barrett court challenged Zeran's
conclusion that distributors were a subset of the "publishers"
protected under section 230,189 noting that it was "entirely reasonable
to assume Congress was aware of th[e] significant and very wellestablished [common law] distinction" between primary publishers
and distributors."'190 Second, the court also disagreed with Zeran that
holding distributors liable would run contrary to the congressional
goals of section 230.' 9' The court challenged Zeran's conclusion that
section 230 was enacted to "promote unfettered speech." '9,
Specifically, the Barrett court questioned "whether a statute that
encourages the restriction of certain types of [offensive] online
material [can] fairly be said to reflect a desire 'to promote unfettered

185. Id. at 761-63.
186. Barrett v. Clark, 2001 WL 881259, at *9 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2001).
187. Id.
188. Barrett 112 Cal. App. 4th at 765-66.
189. The court noted that in "order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute
must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law." Id. at 767 (citing
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)). Barrett challenged the Zeran court's
assertion that "Congress has indeed spoken directly to the issue by employing the legally
significant term 'publisher,' which has traditionally encompassed distributors and original
publishers alike." Id. at 767.
190. Id. at 768.
191. Id. at 771-81.
192. Id. at 775-76.
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Based on these two criticisms, the Barrett court concluded

that section 230 did not abrogate distributor liability.'94
The court acknowledged that by allowing distributor liability to
remain intact, "the common law principle of distributor or
knowledge-based liability" could be enforced.' 95 Noting the potential
chilling effect of notice-based liability, the Barrett court defended its
holding:
We re-emphasize that we take no position on whether distributor
liability would unduly chill online speech . . . Resolution of the
controversy requires information this court . . . does not now

possess: whether a provider or user of an interactive computer
service could, at relatively low expense, determine whether
challenged material is defamatory and remove it, or whether, on
the contrary, the imposition of notice liability would place a burden
on providers and users they could not sustain without automatically
removing all material claimed to be defamatory, thereby
eliminating some and perhaps much information that is
constitutionally protected. The answer to this question depends on
the state of Internet technology, a matter
never addressed by the
96
parties in this case or by the trial court.
The court concluded that because Rosenthal knew of the
defamatory content of the e-mail she was posting, she could be held
liable as a distributor unprotected by section 230.1'
Numerous Internet entities including Google, Amazon, and eBay
have argued that the Barrett appellate court's interpretation of
section 230 results in notice-based liability, under which a web
operator is likely to remove any content upon receiving a notice from
a disgruntled individual who complains of defamation, regardless of
the validity of the complaint.' These Internet businesses argue that
this phenomenon, often referred to as a "heckler's veto," would
seriously chill Internet speech."
Thus, section 230 of the CDA has been applied to Internet
service providers
online bulletin board services, 0 1 chat room

193.

194.

Id. at 775.

Id. at 781.
Id.
196. Id. at 778-79.
197. Id. at 781.
198. Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.corn, Inc. et al. at 37-38, Barrett v. Rosenthal, No.
S122953 (Cal. Dec. 6, 2004).
199. Id. at 38-40.
200. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).
195.
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e-mail list-serves,

interactive dating websites2 O and the

feedback forum of an Internet auction website"' These expansive
applications have provided protection from liability to defendants

with complete editorial control prior to pubhcation, as well as
websites with virtually no pre-publication control whatsoever."
Although the scope of section 230's protection has been applied in

varying degrees by the courts, the precedent is consistent in that every
web-related defendant before every court has been considered an

"interactive computer service" operator within the definition of
section 230. The universal application of section 230 to these
defendants creates a landscape where virtually any web-related
defendant would qualify for section 230 protection, regardless of the
degree of editorial control they possessed.
The cases interpreting section 230 have been less consistent in
the degree of protection offered to web defendants. Following the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Zeran v. America Online,
Inc.,208 many courts interpreted section 230 to provide web operators

with immunity from distributor liability. These decisions were
criticized by scholars2 ° and eventually some courts for applying the
201. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 112 Cal. App. 4th 749 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003).
202. Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).
203. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
204. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
205. Grace v. eBay, 120 Cal. App. 984 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
206. Listserv moderators like the defendant in Batzel v. Smith typically have the ability
to read all e-mails before they are posted to the listserv.
207. Defendants such as eBay do not possess the resources to screen the millions of
postings that are published on an online forum.
208. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
209. The most popular argument asserted by critics is that the Zeran court
misinterpreted section 230, and that future courts should disregard Zeran and hold
interactive web operators liable under traditional common-law distributor liability. At
least six authors have written law review articles on this point. See Emily K. Fritts, Note,
Internet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously
Interpreted CongressionalIntent with Regard to Internet Service Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765
(2004/2005); Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation
Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 469 (2004);
Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet
Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go? 55 VAND. L. REV. 647 (2002); Michelle
J. Kane, Internet Service Provider Liability: Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKLEY TECH.
L.J. 483 (1999); Annemarie Pantazis, Note, Zeran v. America Online, Inc.: Insulating
Internet Service Providers from Defamation Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531
(1999). The most frequently cited article of the six articles is David R. Sheridan's 1997

article, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet. 61 ALB. L. REV. 147 (1997). Sheridan
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protection too broadly, misinterpreting congressional intent and
providing virtually no recourse for individuals defamed on the
Internet. However, the alternative interpretation expounded for three
years in Barrett v. Rosentha210 provided no immunity from distributor

liability and was heavily criticized for implementing a policy that
chills

speech

by

encouraging

web

operators

to

remove

all

questionable content upon receipt of a potentially unfounded
complaint.
IV. Creating a Standard
As discussed in Part III, courts have advanced several
inconsistent applications of section 230 of the CDA. These varying
interpretations create legal challenges related to the common law

doctrine of distributor liability, which provides that passive conduits
of content are only liable for defamation if they transmitted content
that they knew, or should have known, was defamatory." In those
jurisdictions where section 230 has been held to preclude distributor

liability, website operators 212 and users have a level of immunity that
arguably promotes an irresponsible, libel-free Internet where
defamatory

statements

are

posted

with

impunity.

In

those

jurisdictions where courts have contemplated section 230 to cover
only publisher liability, the decisions have provided little guidance as
to how this liability would be applied, resulting in an uncharted legal

territory for web operators. Furthermore, many critics argue that an
adoption of the Barrett v. Rosenthal reasoning, allowing distributor
liability upon notice of a complaint, would place web operators in the
difficult position of reading and evaluating many complaints and

consequently removing all questionable content out of fear of
asserts that the legislative history of section 230 indicates that it was never intended to
immunize distributors. He further asserts that although the correct reading of section 230
would allow for distributor liability, the common law protections of distributor liability
would nonetheless offer substantial protection to web operators. Sheridan explains that
web operators would only be liable if they knew or had reason to know of the defamatory
material-a standard that he argues should provide adequate protection for the
defendants while allowing at least some protection for defamation plaintiffs. Sheridan
asserts that some degree of protection for defamation victims is critical, as the web host is
often the only entity with any power to remove defamatory messages posted on the
Internet.
210. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 112 Cal. App. 4th 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 40 Cal.
4th 33 (Cal. 2006).
211. Restatement § 581(1).
212. For the purposes of this discussion, the author defines website operators broadly
to include all entities that host or otherwise provide web-related forums because courts
have applied section 230 to all Internet-related defendants at this time.
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liability. This would ultimately result in a devastating blow to free
expression on the Internet.
These problems are compounded by the wide range of possible
jurisdictions where a web operator may be called into court, as some
courts have held that website operators may meet the minimum
contacts test for any jurisdiction where users are able to participate
actively on the site.213
Yet the difficulties present greater challenges than inconsistent
or unpredictable legal standards. The policy issues at stake are
significant for defamation victims, Internet users, and interactive
website operators. This chapter will examine the competing policy

issues and then incorporate these policy considerations into a new test
for determining liability for third-party content on the web.
A. The Interests at Stake: The Value of Internet Speech
The difficulties presented by the application of section 230 are
somewhat different from those presented in traditional defamation
cases. While all forums of speech arguably make a valuable

contribution to society, the interactive Internet provides advantages
that are not present in other forms of communication. On the
Internet, the "lonely pamphleteer 22 has a soapbox to express
opinions to thousands of interested readers. Individuals without the
political or social clout to be heard on television can use the Internet

213. Courts have implemented several approaches to establishing minimum contacts
on the Internet. Many courts follow the decision of Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). The Zippo approach adopts a sliding scale of
minimum contacts based on the interactivity of the website. Id. at 1124. On the Zippo
scale, purely passive websites that only provide information do not meet minimum contact
requirements, but websites on the other end of the scale-usually those that solicit
business online-could be hailed into court virtually anywhere Internet transactions
occurred. Id. at 1124-25. Many courts have either expressly adopted the Zippo test or
otherwise examine the degree of passiveness of the defendant's website when determining
minimum contacts. See, e.g., GTE New Media Services Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant's passive website was a factor in determining
that it was not subject to jurisdiction); Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333
(5th Cir. 1999) (adopting sliding scale test); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d
25 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that defendant's website was too passive to find personal
jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing
lawsuit because defendant's website was passive and failed minimum contacts test).
Websites that encourage national participation by allowing third parties to post content
could arguably fall on the interactive side of the Zippo scale.
214. The term "lonely pamphleteer" was originally coined by the Supreme Court. See
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972) (creating "categories of newsmen... [is] a
questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the
right of the lonely pamphleteer... just as much as the large metropolitan publisher").
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to express a wide variety of viewpoints that enrich American

dialogue. These attributes of interactive Internet discussion place the
web at the heart of what ought to be protected by the First
Amendment.
Nearly all speech is protected by the Constitution to some extent,
but the First Amendment affords the broadest protection to political
and social speech in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
2 ' This principle has been clearly reflected
the people.""
in numerous
Supreme Court decisions, most notably in Sullivan, where the Court
affirmed the "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." 216
Courts also have justified the protection of expression by
referencing the "marketplace of ideas" theory. The marketplace of
ideas metaphor can be traced to John Milton's Areopagitica,where he
wrote:
...
and

though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon

the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and

prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open
encounter.217

In this passage, Milton argued that in a society of open speech,

the truth is bound to prevail. This idea provided a foundation for the
scholarship of John Stuart Mill, whose famous essay On Liberty
argued that broad protection for speech is necessary, even for speech
often thought to be offensive, untruthful, or of little social value.2 8
Mill's theory rests on the premise that the ideas expressed in false
speech can only be recognized as inferior if those ideas are brought
into the public arena for scrutiny and testing.219 Justice Holmes found
this argument compelling in his often-quoted dissent in Abrams v.
United States:

215.

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

216. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
217.

JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED

PRINTING 31 (Charles W. Eliot ed., P.F. Collier & Sons 2001) (1643), available at

http://www.bartleby.com/3/3/2.html.
218. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 1 (Longman, Roberts & Green 4th ed. 1999)
(1859), available at http://www.bartleby.com/130/2.htmI.
219. Id.

20081

THE TAMING OF THE INTERNET

But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is2 the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. 20
Thus, the national commitment to "robust" debate in a
marketplace of ideas is a cornerstone of First Amendment
jurisprudence. This commitment should be particularly unfaltering
and steadfast on the Internet, where individuals are participating
every day in the most expansive, barrier-free marketplace of ideas
ever to exist. This marketplace is at its busiest, most productive level
in chat rooms, bulletin boards, blogs, and other websites that allow
multiple users to participate. Consequently, section 230 applies to a
forum of speech that should arguably enjoy the greatest level of First
Amendment protection possible due to its significant contribution to
the open exchange of ideas.
The text of section 230 highlights Congress' commitment to this
valuable forum of free speech. In its statutory findings, Congress
acclaimed the interactive computer services found on the Internet,
calling the Internet "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues
for intellectual activity., 22' Congress also noted that the Internet
"ha[s] flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation., 222 Section 230 also contains the sweeping
proclamation that it is "the policy of the United States... to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by
23
2
regulation.
State
or
Federal
Thus, the Supreme Court, Congress, and scholars have all
recognized the value of open and free debate, with Congress
explicitly noting in section 230 the particular importance of
unfettered speech on the Internet. Yet section 230 itself can be
interpreted in such a manner that jeopardizes interactive and open
speech on the web. For example, if another court were to adopt the
now-overturned reasoning of the California Court of Appeal in

220. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

221. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2008).
222. § 230(a)(4).

223.

§ 230(b)(2).
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Barrett v. Rosenthal,224 many large-scale Internet companies may not
be able to continue hosting the same quantity or quality of interactive
services. Amazon, eBay, Yahoo, Google, and other major Internet
entities have argued that the imposition of distributor liability
promulgated by Barrett would create an impossible situation where
third-party content could not be evaluated due to its tremendous
volume. 225 For example, Amazon makes available millions of thirdparty product and book evaluations, AOL users post more than six
million message board postings each month, and eBay's Feedback
Forum contains 2.4 billion user reviews.226 These companies assert
that notice-based liability would create a "heckler's veto," where any
disgruntled individual could file a complaint claiming defamation, and
the interactive web operator would not have the resources to
investigate the allegation, thereby automatically removing the
questionable comment without investigation into its potential
falsity.127 These

companies have

asserted that distributor-based

liability could prevent them from providing interactive forums in the
future.228
Small interactive websites like blogs also face significant
concerns over the imposition of distributor liability. While the volume
of third-party content may be less on a blog, bloggers nonetheless
flourish largely because they invite commentary and provide a unique
forum for debate on a wide range of significant issues.229 Yet the
resources of the blog host are often limited. Bloggers are often
unaware of their legal rights, easily frightened by the threat of
litigation, and without the financial resources to hire legal counsel.23

224. 112 Cal. App. 4th 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 40 Cal. 4th 33 (Cal. 2006).
225. Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com, Inc. et al. at 37-38, Barrett v. Rosenthal, No.
S122953 (Cal. Dec. 6, 2004).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 38-39.
228. Id. at 40.
229. As of January 2005, twelve percent of surveyed Internet users have posted
comments on someone else's blog. Data Memo from Loe Rainie, PIP Director, Pew

2005),
available
at
Internet
&
American
Life
Project
(January
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-blogging-data.pdf (last visited April 8, 2008).
230. See Amanda Groover Hyland, Bullied Bloggers: Why Bloggers are More
Susceptible to Libel Threats, 1 Fla. Ent. L.R. 75 (forthcoming 2006). The Electronic
Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization that "defends digital rights," summarizes
the problems faced by bloggers on its website. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Bloggers'
FAQ: Overview of Legal Liability Issues, http://www.eff.org/bloggers/Ig/faq-overview.php
(last visited Sept. 23, 2006).
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Clear legal standards that provide some protection to the blog host
are critical in this blossoming Internet forum.23 '
The issues discussed in this section emphasize the need to protect
the interests of the Internet and the many entities involved in its
development. Yet a policy of total laissez-faire on the Internet would
not adequately protect many other crucial interests. The following
section highlights these competing interests.
B. The Interests at Stake: Reputation and the Utility of the Internet
By abolishing distributor liability in most jurisdictions, courts
have created little incentive for interactive website operators to
monitor their website content. Many commentators have argued that
the ultimate result is an internet that shelters and encourages
defamation, as an original poster often is an anonymous user with
shallow
pockets232 and the website operator is shielded by section
2

230 .

This result is obviously problematic for individuals who are
defamed on the Internet. The Restatement's definition of defamation
sheds some light on the frustrations associated with being defamed:
Defamation is a communication that "'tends so to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."' 4 The Supreme Court has noted that the protection of
reputation "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any
'
decent system of ordered liberty."235
The right to protect one's
231. Fortune Magazine honored blogs as the "No. 1 Tech Trend To Watch in 2005."
David Kirkpatrick, Why There's No Escaping the Blog, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2005,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2005/01/10/8230982/index.htm.
Also, Merriam-Webster hailed blogs as the "#1 word of the year" for 2004. MerriamWebster Announces 2004 Words of the Year, Merriam-Webster Online, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/pr/2004-words-of-year.htm.
232. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace,
49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000) (examining process by which anonymous Internet users may be
identified in defamation lawsuits).
233. See, e.g., Melissa Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional
Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447 (2006);
Stephanie Blumstein, The New Immunity in Cyberspace: The Expanded Reach of the
Communications Decency Act to the Libelous "Re-Poster," 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 407
(2003); Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrettv. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability
for Third-PartyContent on the Internet, 19 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 469 (2004).
234. Restatement § 559.
235. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 402 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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reputation also has been viewed as an intangible property right,
whereby a person has earned a superior reputation through goodwill,
skill or other noble qualities.23 6 These hard-earned positive attributes
manifest themselves in the form of a good reputation which has a
monetary value and should be protected under the law.237
Without liability for third-party defamation on the Internet,
these principles of protection for reputation seem almost forgotten.
Moreover, the libel victim's injuries may often be exacerbated on the
Internet,23 s where the initial republication may be copied and
republished over and over again, with each instance potentially
protected under the Zeran239 interpretation of section 230 that
immunizes web hosts from liability.
Uncontrolled defamation also is harmful to society as a whole, as
the utility of published information is decreased if its readers cannot
rely on its truthfulness. As one commentator has explained:
[D]efamation law exists not merely to validate the dignitary
interests of individual plaintiffs; defamation law also helps to make
meaningful discourse possible. Defamation law has a civilizing
influence on public discourse: it gives society a means for
announcing that certain speech has crossed the bounds of
propriety.
This proposition is particularly relevant on the Internet, where
information is uploaded, downloaded, read and republished at a
blazing pace throughout the globe. And with thirty-five percent of
American Internet users getting their news on the web each day,241 the
accuracy of high-traffic news websites is critical if society is to stay
well-informed. Without any protection of the integrity of this forum,
its value is likely to be diminished.
The Internet may also provide less incentive for users to publish
truthful information, as many web forums do not cater to customers
236.

See Robert C. Post, Symposiun, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law:

Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 693-94 (1986).

237. Id. at 694.
238. The problem of defamation on the Internet may also provide additional
challenges in that the libel victim may not realize the existence of the defamatory
comment until it has long been available online for viewing and republishing.
239. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
240. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace,
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 885-86 (2000) (citing Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 713 (1986) and
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (Harvard University Press 1995)).
241. John B. Horrigan, Online News: For Many Home Broadband Users, the Internet Is

a Primary News Source, Pew Internet and American Life Project, March 22, 2006,
availableat http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPNews.and.Broadband.pdf.
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and are not designed to generate a profit.242 Mainstream news
organization may be held to lenient standards of liability for
defamation as well, but they must nonetheless ensure the quality and
utility of their news product so that their customers return for more
and keep the business profitable. 43 Thus, web operators that are
unconcerned with the profitability of their site may be less likely to
maintain checks on accuracy or truthfulness.
Moreover, an examination of section 230 reveals that Congress'
intent in passing the CDA was to promote a responsible Internet. The
committee report pertaining to section 230 indicates that the statute
was designed to overrule Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co.,2 " which held Prodigy responsible for a posting to its online
bulletin board because it had editorial control over the postings.' 5
The intent to overrule Stratton Oakmont implies that Congress was
particularly concerned that ISP's would be punished because they
attempted to police their websites for harmful content. This intent is
explicitly stated in the policy objectives of section 230, where
Congress proclaimed its desire to "remove disincentives for the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to restrict their children's access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material."2 "6 Yet the cases that
interpret section 230 to immunize distributor liability create
disincentives to police content.
C.

Balancing the Interests

A rule that abrogates distributor liability, such as the ruling in
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. fails to protect the reputational rights
of the defamed and creates disincentives for responsible Internet
publishing. Yet holding interactive computer service operators to
traditional standards of distributor liability may pose problems that
threaten the free flow of information online, disturbing First
242. Blogs, for example, are often created by individuals as a means of advocacy or
self-fulfillment, rather than a business enterprise. See, e.g., BIZ STONE, WHO LET THE
BLOGS OUT? 115-21 (2004) (citing various aspects of self-fulfillment achieved through
blogging).
243. See, e.g., Lillian R. Bevier, The Invisible Hand of the Marketplace of Ideas, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 233-255 (Lee C. Bollinger
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (identifying news as a product and comparing defamation
liability to traditional product liability law).
244. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
245. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
246. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2008).
247. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Amendment values and the marketplace of ideas it protects. This
section proposes a new method of examining certain cases of thirdparty Internet defamation. By looking to traditional doctrines of libel
jurisprudence and applying them to the new frontier of the Internet, a
solution can be crafted that carefully balances these competing
interests.
D.

The Supreme Court and Constitutional Protections

In the 1960s and 1970s landmark libel cases, the Supreme Court
established basic principles that govern the competing interests of free
expression and protection of reputation-the same competing interests
creating problems on the Internet today. These Supreme Court opinions can
shed light on the appropriate solution to the challenge of liability for thirdparty defamation on the Internet.
E.

Debate on Public Issues

A significant factor that has carried great weight in the Court's
decisions is the protection of public debate. The Court first noted the
importance of public debate on issues of political importance in New
York Times v. Sullivan."' In Sullivan, the Court implemented the
actual malice standard, under which public officials must prove that
the defendant published a defamatory statement with knowledge of
its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth. 49 This publisher-friendly
standard was deemed necessary to protect public debate on issues of
political significance."' The Court explained that the Sullivan case
was considered against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.25 '
The importance of civic deliberations was reaffirmed as a
significant factor in what would become that actual malice test in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.252 In Curtis Publishing, the Court
examined the cases of two individuals who sued the press for
defamation. The two men were not public officials but were
nonetheless in positions of influence and were involved in important

248.
249.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.

250.
251.
252.

Id.

Id. at 270.
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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public affairs. 253 Noting that "the public interest in the circulation of
the materials here involved, and the publisher's interest in circulating
'
them, is not less than that involved in New York Times,"254
the Court
extended actual malice protection to statements about "public
figures. 255
The Supreme Court again advanced the importance of public
debate as an essential consideration in the application of actual
256 In Rosenbloom,
malice when it decided Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.
the Court applied the actual malice test "to all discussion and
communication involving matters of public or general concern,
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous., 527 The Court determined that the degree of appropriate
First Amendment protection should be based on the subject matter at
issue, rather then solely the public or private status of the plaintiff:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
"voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect, and significance
258 of the conduct,
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
The Court, however, retreated from this content-based
application of actual malice when it ruled in Gertz v. Welsh that actual
malice could only apply to private figures when those individuals
intentionally "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved., 25 9 This ruling changed the focus from the public status of
the controversy to the public status of the plaintiff.
F.

Access to the Media

The Supreme Court presented another key basis behind the
application of actual malice when it ruled that public figures would
have to prove actual malice due in part to their access to the media.2 °
253. Id. at 135-141.
254. Id. at 154.
255. Id. at 155.
256. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
257. Id. at 44.
258. Id. at 43.
259. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
260. Id. The Court noted that public figures have "sufficient access to the means of
counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of
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In Gertz, the Court held that private individuals who thrust
themselves into a debate on matters of social or political importance
will have to prove actual malice, partially because these individuals
have access to the media and can seek "self-help."26 ' The Court
explained that public officials and public figures "usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally
enjoy. '262 Thus, access to the media is a central consideration in
determining what cases should be covered under actual malice.
G. Access on the Internet
While Sullivan, Curtis Publishing, and Rosenbloom each
expanded the scope of protection for libel defendants, Gertz limited
the application somewhat by retreating from the "public controversy"
requirement and instating a rule that private persons should only be
required to prove actual malice when they thrust themselves into the
"vortex" of a public issue. But many critics have observed,263 and this
author agrees, that the Court's reasoning in Gertz may have rested on
accurate assumptions when it was decided, but has since become
outdated. When Gertz was decided in 1974, media outlets were few in
number, with several major media companies controlling virtually all
of the broadcast news,"6 a
major newspaper in each region
providing nearly all print news. Individuals seeking an audience had
to find access to these limited resources, a feat that usually could only
be accomplished by the famous or powerful. The advent of the
Internet changes this assumption, however, as the web provides a
soapbox to anyone with a computer. Thus, an argument can be made
that the Gertz decision should not apply to Internet defamation cases,
where even private individuals have access to self-help in the same

the defamatory statements." Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
261. Id. at 344-45.
262. Id. at 344.
263.

See, e.g., MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE

DIGITAL AGE 87-90 (MIT Press 2003); Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A
FirstAmendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer Bulletin
Board Speech, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV 235 (1995); Aaron Perzanowski, Comment,
Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 833 (2006).
264. In1970 just 862 local television stations, dominated by three networks, operated
in the United States. David Demers, Media Concentration in the United States 12-13
(2001), availableat http://www.cem.ulaval.ca/CONCetatsUnis.pdf.
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forum in which they were defamed. Arguably, if the Gertz doctrine
did not apply to the Internet, courts examining Internet defamation
cases could return to the Rosenbloom test 265 of applying actual malice
based on the public importance of the speech. The author does not
expressly advocate a return to Rosenbloom, nor does the author
assert that individuals become public figures if they are defamed on
the Internet or use the Internet to defend themselves against
defamation.266 This thesis does assert, however, that within the realm
of the Internet, a private plaintiff's access to self-help is a significant
factor that should be weighed in consideration of the appropriate
standard of liability in third-party defamation cases, possibly to the
extent of carving out an exception to the Gertz doctrine providing
that it should not be applied to Internet libel cases.
H. Putting it All Together
The Supreme Court has indicated that First Amendment
safeguards must be elevated to protect libel defendants when the
plaintiff has access to the media, and the speech at issue is of great
political or social importance.
Users of interactive Internet forums are discussing issues of great
political and social significance, and those who are defamed often
have access to respond to the statements in the very forum where the
libelous statement was posted. These factors should place the
defamation defendant in a highly-protected zone of Constitutional
safety.
Yet the Zeran scheme of blanket protection for web operators
compromises integral interests that were previously discussed-the
reputational rights of the plaintiff and the utility of the Internet. To
protect these values, distributor liability would have to remain intact
to at least some extent. This assertion is particularly important in light
of the longstanding common-law roots of distributor liability and the
significant probability that Congress never
intended to remove its
267
application from the realm of the Internet.
265. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
266. The Supreme Court noted in Hutchinson v. Proxmire that a libel plaintiff should
not be considered a public figure solely because he defended himself in the media. 443
U.S. 111 (1979). This thesis does not assert that an Internet defamation victim should
become a public figure because the victim attempted to seek vindication on the Internet.
Instead, the thesis asserts that certain Internet defamation cases should be considered
under actual malice review because self-help is easily available to victims. This thesis also
asserts that victims who attempt to use self-help by redressing libelous statements
themselves should be viewed favorably by the courts.
267. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2008).
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Applying distributor liability in its traditional common-law form
to third-party content on the Internet, however, may impose serious
burdens on the free flow of information online. An interactive
computer service operator would be liable for the defamatory
comments of its users if it knew the comments were false or had
reason to know of the falsity.2 The imposition of this standard would
create the potential of a serious chilling effect on Internet speech, as
all interactive Internet service operators would "have reason to
know" of the falsity of a posting if they received a communication
from the alleged victim indicating the statement was defamatory. The
operator would then be inclined to remove the posting to avoid
distributor liability. Thus, a party who is upset about negative
comments regarding them on the Internet would merely need to write
the host of the website in order to have the posting removed, whether
or not the posting was true, false, or merely a matter of opinion. The
end result could lead to truthful and valuable information being
removed from the marketplace of ideas on the Internet.
The competing values discussed here-reputational rights,
Internet utility, and the free flow of Internet information-create the
need for a new test, as traditional distributor liability does not protect
enough speech, yet blanket immunity protects too much. This difficult
problem has already been addressed by the Court to some extent in
its landmark libel rulings. When the interests of unfettered political
discourse clashed with reputational interests, the Court devised the
actual malice standard to harmonize the opposing values. In creating
and implementing the actual malice standard, the court emphasized
two factors that are present in interactive Internet speechproductive political or social debate and access to the media. By
looking to the Court's reasoning in its actual malice rulings, a
workable solution can be created. The next section proposes a test
that applies actual malice to distributor liability in certain third-party
Internet defamation cases.

I.

Applying Actual Malice to Distributor Liability

Interactive Internet web operators who host forums of political
or social commentary and freely allow user comments meet both
factors that were highlighted by the Supreme Court as the basis for
actual malice review. Therefore, this class of web operators could be
held liable for third-party content under the distributor liability
doctrine, but governed by the actual malice standard. The standard
268. Restatement § 581(1).
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would require the plaintiff to show that the operator left the
offending statement online for an unreasonable length of time after
the operator knew it was false, or acted in reckless disregard of its
falsity. This test would be consistent with the Supreme Court's
commitment to the protection of political and social speech and its
heightened threshold for plaintiffs with media access. The test is also
consistent with an interpretation of section 230 that allows for
distributor-based liability.
To determine whether a defendant qualified for actual malice
review, courts should examine the Internet forum's procedure for
posting comments. If the forum does not allow a user to respond to
the comments of another user, the plaintiff's access to the forum is
seriously limited. Such a circumstance would weigh strongly against
the web operator, possibly leading the court to apply a traditional
distributor liability test to the defendant's conduct rather then actual
malice. The popular website dontdatehimgirl.com, for example,
allows users to search a database of "un-dateable" men, where
women post messages identifying men by name and detailing,
presumably from personal experience, why each man is a bad date
and an undesirable boyfriend.2 6 9 The site provides a "comments"
section that allows the men to respond to any allegations, providing
them access to the very forum where they were potentially defamed.
The responsive comment is posted via a direct link to the accusatory
webpage. This feature weighs in favor of the application of the actual
malice standard in any defamation actions brought against the site.
Courts should also examine the political or social nature of the forum
and its user comments in order to determine the appropriate standard of
review to apply. Internet commentary about issues of political or social
importance falls within the stronger levels of constitutional protection and
should weigh in favor of applying actual malice. Websites focused on more
trivial concerns such as celebrity gossip might not meet the constitutional
burden to apply actual malice. Returning to the Don't Date Him Girl
example, complaints of cheating ex-boyfriends may not rise to the level of
social importance necessary for the application of actual malice. The web
operator in this case would of course make arguments about the social
benefit and importance provided by the forum, leaving the court to decide
the appropriate standard of review.
269.

Don't Date Him Girl Home Page, http://www.dontdatehimgirl.com (last visited

April 8, 2008).
270. Registered users can post comments responding to any posting. For an example
click on any posting to see comments. Don't Date Him Girl website,
http://dontdatehimgirl.com/ about us/index.html (last visited April 8, 2008).
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Web operators that meet both requirements-political or social
significance and access to defamation victims-would benefit from
the application of the actual malice standard of review and would not
be subject to notice-based liability advanced by the California Court
of Appeal for three years in Barrett v. Rosenthal.27' The standard
advocated in Barrett would require the defendant to be held liable if it
received a defamation complaint and failed to remove the content in
question, resulting in a tremendous incentive to remove any content
that is called into question without investigation. By applying actual
malice to the distributor liability cases, however, the court could look
to the detail and sufficiency of the victim's complaint and consider the
appropriateness of the operator's response to that particular
complaint.272 Complaints that contained little or no factual basis to
support the allegation of defamation would require little or no action
on the part of the web operator. Detailed, timely, good-faith
complaints would provide the web operator with more information to
make a decision to remove the content. This dialogue between the
complainant and the operator could provide the basis for the court to
determine whether or not the operator acted with reckless disregard
for the truth. This analysis would give the courts a similar role to its
current job of investigating the newsgathering and editorial process of
allegedly defamatory news stories.
An Internet posting that the complainant has a history of
criminal convictions, for example, could be easily refuted by the
complainant in a detailed notice to the web operator. If the
complainant did not provide any documentation or support in the
notice, and the web operator left the comments online, the
insufficiency of the complaint would weigh against a finding of actual
malice. This approach places the burden on the potential plaintiff,
who not only is in a better position to provide the information, but
who also would bear the burden of proof if the case went before a
court.273

Courts might also examine the complainant's reaction to the
allegedly defamatory posting. If the complainant could have defended
himself in the same forum, but nevertheless chose not to do so, his
failure to utilize his access to other readers may be weighed against
him in court. This factor could encourage defamation victims to
271. 112 Cal. App. 4th 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 40 Cal. 4th 33 (Cal. 2006).
272. This process of review would parallel the inquiry courts currently make into the
investigative and editorial process of news stories that are later found to be false.
273. Plaintiffs in actual malice cases bear the burden of proof. See St. Amant v.
Thomson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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engage in the debate and remedy the damage to their reputation
themselves, rather than seek immediate redress in the courts.
It is also important to note that although applying actual malice
to a particular defamation case usually results in a more difficult
standard of proof for the plaintiff, the test proposed in this thesis
would have an opposite effect. In the numerous states and circuits
that follow Zeran and interpret section 230 to provide distributor
immunity, plaintiffs defamed by a third party do not have any
recourse against the web operator at all. This actual malice test
actually provides a greateropportunity for the plaintiff to seek redress
in the courts, as the test allows liability in some circumstances. The
next section will highlight this point by applying the actual malice
distributor test to the facts of Zeran.
J.

The New Approach applied to Zeran

In Zeran, plaintiff Kenneth Zeran was the victim of a malicious
Internet hoax wherein an America Online user posted fake
advertisements on an AOL bulletin board selling t-shirts glorifying
the Oklahoma City bombing."' The anonymous AOL user posted
Zeran as the contact person for those people who might be interested
in purchasing the shirts, publishing Zeran's name and home phone
number on the ad.275 Zeran notified AOL of the postings, and
although AOL did remove the initial ad, AOL did nothing to block
the user's account.276 Similar ads continued to appear on the AOL
site, all presumably from the same anonymous user. 77 Zeran became
overwhelmed with threatening phone calls, including some death
threats, and eventually required police to protect him in his home.
Under the actual malice distributor test, the court would first
determine if the forum, in this case AOL, provided a mechanism in
the bulletin board for Zeran to defend himself. The facts provided in
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion do not specifically state
whether or not Zeran would have been able to post a reply to the
initial malicious ad, but as most Internet bulletin boards are available
for public comment, this hypothetical will assume Zeran had the
opportunity to reply. This opportunity to reply would satisfy the first
prerequisite of the actual malice distributor liability test.

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The second step would be to examine the political or social
nature of the AOL bulletin board and the content at issue therein.
Public attitude towards the Oklahoma City bombing is an issue of
social importance, thereby meeting this requirement as well.
Because the bulletin board provided space for the victim's
response and because the content was socially significant, AOL would
qualify for actual malice. The burden would then shift to Zeran to
prove that AOL acted with knowledge of the posting's falsity or with
reckless disregard for its truth. The court would begin this analysis by
examining the detail and timeliness of Zeran's notice to AOL. As
Zeran immediately contacted AOL and provided enough information
to leave no doubt that he was not the author of the malicious
advertisement, AOL had sufficient information to know that the
postings were false. As AOL did not attempt to cancel the account of
the anonymous user, the court likely would find that Zeran met his
burden by proving that AOL knew the postings were false and did
not take adequate action to prevent further dissemination of the
defamatory content. AOL's knowledge, combined with its insufficient
response, arguably would amount to actual malice.
One factor may, however, weigh against a finding of liability for
AOL. The facts in the opinion do not indicate that Zeran made any
effort to vindicate himself on the AOL bulletin board that hosted the
original ads."9 Zeran's failure to seek self-help would not be viewed
favorably by the court, although the present facts are so egregious
that a court would likely find for Zeran nonetheless.
In Zeran's case, the application of actual malice would have
provided Zeran with the potential to recover damages from AOLan outcome later advocated by numerous following courts that would
have protected him more than the test actually applied to him in
Zeran. Thus, despite the usual result of actual malice resulting in a
more limited protection of plaintiffs, in third-party Internet
defamation cases actual malice would allow plaintiffs a better chance
at recovery.
V. Conclusion
The all-encompassing immunization of distributor liability that
many courts have found under section 230 provides a safe haven for

279. As the facts are unclear, the bulletin board may not have provided other users
with any option to reply to postings, in which case Zeran obviously could not have been
expected to reply. The author's analysis is based on the assumption that a reply was
possible.
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defamation and consequently diminishes the usefulness of the
Internet. This interpretation is further troubling because it does not
appear to be consistent with the legislative intent of the statute. The
application of traditional distributor liability, however, places website
operators in the difficult position of notice-based liability, which may
ultimately result in the removal of truthful or opinionated comments.
Expensive lawsuits may also drive low-budget sites like Craigslist.com
out of business.
Website operators that allow user responses and provide a forum
for valuable political or social commentary meet the burdens that
provided the basis for actual malice review in the landmark Supreme
Court libel cases. By applying actual malice review to distributor
liability, courts could examine the pre-litigation dialogue between the
web operator and the complainant to determine whether the operator
acted with reckless disregard for the truth. This test would protect the
most valuable Internet forums from baseless complaints, encourage
libel victims to seek self-help in the very forum where they were
defamed, and provide a remedy for those individuals who were
genuinely injured by false statements on the Internet.
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